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Abstract.  Social economics has long been concerned with the effects on human societies of 
market-coordinated processes of economic innovation. But the social economy also causes 
invention and innovation, an aspect that has received less attention. This paper reviews three 
new approaches to the study of the growth of knowledge in economic systems as driven 
expressly by socio-cultural mechanisms and dynamics. The first are so-called ‘social network 
markets’ and ‘novelty bundling markets’. The second extends from ‘knowledge commons’ to 
‘innovation commons’. The third is a socio-cultural semiotic process of group dynamics. 
These models represent different ways the social economy generates newness and produces 
innovation. 
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‘Mere accumulation is not enough. Economic development does not consist merely in 
the piling up of things, but in the accumulation of new kinds of things.’  
 – Kenneth Boulding (1964) 
 
There are only a few overarching consensus positions in economics, but the nature 
and causes of economic growth is one of them. Neoclassical growth economists 
(Solow 1958), endogenous growth theorists (Romer 1986, Aghion and Howitt 1992), 
and evolutionary, Institutional and Austrian economists alike (Nelson and Winter 
1982, Loasby 1999, Dopfer and Potts 2008) all converge on the proposition that long-
run economic growth is largely explained as a growth of knowledge process in a 
market-capitalist economic system. The specific forms of economic institutions can 
seemingly exhibit considerable variation without significantly affecting this basic 
proposition (Hall and Soskice, 2001, Rodrik 2007), and so too can a wide variety of 
socio-cultural systems be accommodated within these institutions (North 2005, Greif 
2006). The overarching point is that within a broad institutional range in which 
markets can openly function, enterprise is relatively free, capital investment is 
sufficiently secure, and governments adequately furnish public goods (including 
social order and external defense), then the main driver of long-run economic growth, 
and therefore determinant of progress in aggregate social welfare, is the arrival rate of 
new ideas in the form of technological change, as invention, and as innovation, the 
process by which it endogenously transforms the economy (Schumpeter 1934). 
 Now along the way social economics has inserted itself into this story at many 
points, particularly about the accommodation of economic institutions to the needs of 
human society, and about the redistribution of the gains from economic growth, and 
more broadly about the ethical meaning and human value of economic development 
(Etzioni 1988). But the one part of this account that has been systematically ignored 
by social economics is the very engine of this evolutionary dynamic process – namely 
the social economy as an explanation of the origins of novelty per se (Elam 1993). 
For the most part, the social economy is formulated as a response to novelty, 
innovation and technological growth (e.g. Boulding 1978), rather than as an 
explanation (e.g. Boulding 1956). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to review 
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the economics of the origin of new ideas, technology and innovation in order to 
propose some new models in which socio-cultural and semiotic processes (rather than 
resource allocation and organization, viz. Arrow 1962a, Lundvall 1992) are the main 
drivers of invention and innovation. 
 There is a very obvious sense in which innovation is product and process of 
the social economy. If we start with the social economy ‘defined broadly as the 
complex intersection of markets, governments and communities’ (Emami 2012: 401) 
then it is trivial to observe that innovation derives from markets (through innovating 
firms, patents), governments (publically funded R&D, public science), and 
communities (social innovation (Mulgan 2013), user innovation (von Hippel 1988)). 
The innovation systems model shows how various kinds of activities, investments and 
actors and the interactions between different organizations and institutions are 
involved in technological advance (Nelson 1993, Freeman 1995, Sharif 2006). We 
can also appreciate how innovation and the development of new knowledge is shaped 
by the social economy, through its level of permissions, supports and restraints, and 
also how it is guided by its feedback, through the collective focus of science and 
technology resources onto certain social problems (Nelson 2011). Schumpeterian 
creative destruction is quite obviously a process that plays out socially and culturally, 
as well as technologically and industrially. But observe that these socio-cultural 
considerations are all in the manner of analysis of institutional forms that govern the 
processes that direct resources and shape the organization of innovation. None of this 
offers a theory of how sociocultural processes actually produce innovation. That 
remains something that research scientists, engineers, designers and entrepreneurs do. 
The social economy in this sense governs innovation, but seemingly it does not 
actually produce innovation.    
 It is of course possible to construct models of innovation that are assembled in 
terms of socio-cultural orderings and processes. The problem is that such approaches 
tend to fall outside the legitimate domain of economic analysis. Either they depart 
from models of rational choice subject to constraints (for example, innovation as 
‘creativity’, or innovation emergent from particular characteristics of groups, such as 
18
th
 century Protestants), or they depart from models of innovation constructed in 
terms of the allocation or organization of scarce resources. The three approaches we 
outline here all fall within what might at first seem to be the narrow ambit of a choice-
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theoretic economic analysis, however they are fundamentally descriptive of cultural 
processes that are elements of the social economy. We propose these three models as 
an analytic starting point for the development of a distinct social economics of the 
endogenous process of invention and innovation.  
 It is also clear that this domain of the socio-cultural effect on the development 
of new ideas has a long and serious history in the philosophy of science following the 
work of Thomas Kuhn, particular in the work by Paul Feyerabend (1975) on anarchist 
epistemology, which was a way of understanding the depth to which socio-cultural 
cultural processes were integrated into the scientific approach. In science and 
technology studies (Bijker et al. 1987) and related fields that draw on the sociology of 
science (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985) a solid body of work has developed that 
illustrates the social construction of not only science but also of new technologies 
(Williams and Edge 1996). While running parallel to this, we certainly draw upon 
these ideas. 
 Our purpose here is to bring human values and social context into the study of 
the economics of innovation. The problem with the market failure model of 
innovation (Arrow 1962a) is precisely that it invites a raft of government solutions – 
from intellectual property and corporate subsidy through to public research 
universities and government-run science laboratories (Martin and Scott 2000) – that 
tend to crowd-out civil society and community-level solutions. A social economics of 
innovation will seek to better understand the role that the social sector (cf. the market 
sector or the government sector) plays in the innovation process.   
The three models illustrate the basic theme that we suggest is central to a 
social economics of innovation: namely the socio-cultural processing of uncertainty 
through harnessing the distributed knowledge of others. (Elam (1993) also 
emphasizes this point in relation to Ken Arrow’s information economics.) ‘Social 
network markets’ and ‘novelty bundling markets’ both use socially distributed 
information to deal with innovation abundance. ‘Innovation commons’ enable the 
pooling of distributed information about a new technology through socio-culturally 
mediated groups. The theory of ‘demic concentration’ shows how knowledge-using 
culturally formed groups (demes) discover knowledge in the conflict of interactions 
with other demes. Social economics has contributed much to the study of the 
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consequences of economic innovation, but we conclude that it might also contribute 
to the study of its causes too.       
 
2 ORIGINS OF INNOVATION 
While not always seen in distinction, and certainly containing much overlap, there are 
nevertheless two broad approaches that can be discerned from the perspective of 
social economics to the study of the process of invention and innovation, and the 
growth of knowledge in economic systems. These are the discovery model, in which 
economic resources are used to create a new idea that didn’t exist before, and the 
learning model, in which economic resources are used to acquire an idea that exists 
somewhere else. Both discovery and learning have the same result from the micro 
perspective – the individual agent acquires novelty. But they have different systemic 
properties that formulate a different economic problem.  
The discovery model is the macro model for the organization of the pursuit of 
knowledge that does not already exist, but must be discovered. This requires investing 
scarce resources, and has an uncertain pay-off. The economics of science (Nelson 
1959, Arrow 1962a) and the economics of corporate or public R&D (Dosi 1988) fit 
squarely here, and whether formulated at the level of the firm, industry or nation they 
are all modelled with a production function for knowledge in which economic 
resources are inputs and new ideas are outputs. In the absence of uncertainty, 
efficiency conditions are defined when the marginal cost of research inputs (e.g. 
research labour, research capital) equals the marginal benefit of research outputs 
(Stigler 1961). The discovery model describes the endogenous economics of the 
process by which the aggregate production frontier shifts outward through time by 
ongoing investment in knowledge discovery (Popper 1972). This model is usually 
then augmented by a theory of effective demand to explain why particular directions 
of research and discovery are favoured over others, and how the various market or 
social-democratic mechanisms direct the targeting of resources toward particular lines 
of discovery (Sarewitz and Nelson 2008)   
The learning model focuses on the diffusion of knowledge rather than its 
origination. Specifically, it is concerned with the process by which knowledge is 
acquired that is new to the agent, firm, industry or nation, but that already exists 
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elsewhere. This social process of evolutionary learning (Dosi et al 2005, Emami 
2012) is used to understand firm-level competitive market processes driven by 
imitative learning and technology diffusion (Nelson and Winter 1982), industrial 
dynamics shaped by economic evolution; and catch-up and convergence in economic 
development (Romer 1986, Aghion and Howitt 1992). A variation on the learning 
model (temporal rather than spatial) is the self-learning model in which a technology 
runs down an average cost curve as a function of cumulative experience, also known 
as ‘learning by doing’ (Arrow 1962b).  
Social learning is a powerful process that harnesses one of the main 
mechanisms in economic growth, namely what Adam Smith first diagnosed as the 
division of labour and specialization. What happens is that different people specialize 
in solving different problems and then we each of us copy the form of those 
specialized solutions by socially observing how specialized and skilled others act in 
particular situations. In the absence of social learning, agents have to discover (i.e. 
produce) all new information themselves, which is inefficient in opportunity cost 
terms. The very possibility of social progress and economic evolution thus depends 
upon an effective division of labour and division of knowledge in the production of 
new knowledge (Loasby 1999, Ziman 2000), which depends upon the communicative 
social systems of knowledge transmission required to re-coordinate all of this 
(McCloskey 2010, 2015). The social economy is a crucial aspect of this higher-order 
evolutionary economic process of knowledge discovery (specialization) and 
knowledge social learning (exchange). There are further overlaps between these 
models. For an individual, society or nation, investment in education is a process of 
social learning (vertical transmission) and investment in higher education will often 
extend to competitive processes of discovery. Firms may learn from observation of 
other firms (horizontal social learning) while at the same time engaged in R&D 
(competitive discovery). These will often be complementary investments, such that 
effort devoted to discovery increases the efficacy of social or imitative learning.  
So there knowledge discovery there is social learning. These types of 
innovation processes are modeled as an allocation of resources to discovery (a 
production function approach) or to social learning (a gains from specialization 
approach). But there are three further types of innovation process that do not fit neatly 
into these standard templates of economic analysis. We organize these under three 
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headings – (1) market adaptations; (2) knowledge commons; (3) and cultural demes – 
but what these share is that they are cooperative, communicative and socio-cultural 
processes that are constituted by distinctly human actions as shaped by evolution, 
history and civilization.      
We develop here a different line on cultural economics and its relation to 
economics of growth and innovation than is usually pursued in the mainstream 
literature. Currently, there are two distinct meanings of the economics of culture. The 
first is the application of microeconomic analysis to the problem of efficient cultural 
production and consumption. This is cultural economics. The second is how culture, 
as socially learned preferences and knowledge, affects economic behaviour and 
outcomes. This is the cultural foundations of economics.  
Cultural economics is a branch of applied microeconomics concerned with the 
efficiency of the production and consumption of cultural goods and services. It is built 
around the supposition of widespread market failure (Throsby 1994) and the welfare 
maximizing potential of government intervention in cultural markets. There is little 
connection to economics of growth and innovation, although that does occur in the 
‘creative industries’ end of this field of study (Potts 2011). However, the economics 
of arts and culture shares the same analytic set up as the economics of science and 
new knowledge, in being the analysis of a public good beset by market failure. The 
diagnosis of a positive externality, and the policy solutions, tend to be similar.     
 The other line through which culture enters economics is through norms, 
habits and routines as endogenous preferences and cultural capital, as the cultural 
foundations of economics. Culture is thus a theory of individual preferences acquired 
through social learning (Boyd and Richerson 2005, Mesoudi 2011). This explains the 
existence of homogeneity in populations of interacting individuals, and quasi-stable 
group preferences (Bowles 1998). Cooperative behaviours are more likely under these 
circumstances (Nowak 2006, Bruni et al 2014). These culturally directed social 
learning models also underpin the formation of social capital (Burt 2000) and cultural 
capital (Jones 2006). 
 A fruitful sociological line of inquiry has been to examine the relation 
between the cultural traits of a group and innovative performance. Shane (1993) 
found that cultural values of individualism, power distance, and uncertainty 
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acceptance correlated positively with innovative performance. A meta study by 
Taylor and Wilson (2012) confirmed Shane’s original findings, but also that certain 
types of cultural group characteristics associated with collectivism (such as 
patriotism) were correlated with innovative performance group, while other types 
(familism and localism) were not. The implication was to point to ways in which 
manipulation of culture could affect the rate of innovation and thus economic growth 
and development, which is to say to bring cultural policy within the ambit of 
innovation policy. However, we want to set out an alternative line of inquiry into the 
relation between culture and innovation that is based not on culture as a subsector of 
the economy, nor on characteristic forms of preferences and behaviours, but rather on 
a conception of culture as generative, and of the cultural economy as a 
communicative rather than institutional source of newness. This approach derives 
neither from economics nor sociology, but from the further-away fields of cultural 
studies (Hartley 2009).    
 
3 CULTURE, MARKETS & NOVELTY 
Standard models of rational choice in markets do not necessarily require complete 
information – it can be stochastic, with models of choice under uncertainty; or it can 
be partitioned, as in models of bounded rationality; or unbalanced, as in models of 
asymmetric information. But these models do require complete preferences: this is 
why they can deal with uncertainty, but not with novelty (Potts 2010, Karpik 2010, 
Hutter 2010). The difference is that with genuine novelty, as a consequence of 
innovation, the agent does not necessarily have preferences at all prior to some kind 
of experience with the new good or service. They have to form preferences with 
which then to make choices. In standard economic models, this occurs as individual 
learning. But that is a generally inefficient solution as the number of new goods 
increases. It also makes no use of specialization. 
The general form of the solution to the problem of ‘choice under novelty’ (cf. 
choice under uncertainty) was outlined by Earl and Potts (2004) with the use of other 
people’s preferences (i.e. a ‘market for preferences’). This approach makes use of 
specialization and distributed social learning. Building on the work of Schelling 
(1973) and Kirman (1993) this concept was extended in Potts et al. (2008) to define 
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entire sectors that routinely produce novelty (specifically the so-called ‘creative 
industries’) as instances of ‘social network markets’. The point of this new 
classification was to note that with choice under novelty and the systematic use of 
other people’s choices and preferences as inputs into individual choice, then the 
complex socio-cultural networks over which this information flows – use of other 
people’s preferences, observing the choices of others (Beck 2007, Bentley et al. 2011) 
– play at least as significant a coordination role as price signals. Social network 
markets thus describe a wide range of economic activity in which because of inherent 
novelty due to abundant innovation, economic choices are largely determined by the 
choice of others on a social network.  
The significance of the existence of social network markets is that they are an 
emergent socio-cultural adaptation to continual, abundant flows of novelty – which is 
to say to in a market-capitalist economy driven by widespread innovation. What is 
particularly interesting here is that the price system is not the primary coordination 
mechanism (although once preferences stabilize, it reassumes that role). The relative 
growth of the creative industries, and the normalization of their business models and 
market strategies into other parts of the economy, can in part be explained by their 
place at the leading edge of social network markets that have harnessed cultural 
processes into market coordination institutions.   
Building on the work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), Stark (2009) and 
Balaz and Stark (2010), and Potts (2012) develops the concept of a novelty bundling 
market that extends the concept of a social network market to incorporate three 
further conditions. Specifically: (1) multiple novelties experienced at once; (2) a 
context of search where consumers don’t necessarily know what they’re looking for 
but will know it when they find it; and (3) an emergent organizational and market 
form that intermediates between producers and consumers of novelty. 
Examples of novelty bundling markets are situations of abundant continual 
flows of novelty where consumers of presented with multiple curated novelties at 
once, usually in a highly social or culturally structured environment such as arts and 
music festivals, eisteddfods, academic and research conferences, fashion and 
technology magazines, blogs, think tanks, dating and introduction agencies, and 
branded garment retailers, among other instances. Novelty bundling markets are a 
culturally structured platform for processing novelties that have been curated by 
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expert amateur consumers (and/or producers) turned professional novelty bundlers. 
Interestingly, multiple novelties are often easier to consume than singular novelties 
because of comparison. Also, novelty consumption is often facilitated by occurring in 
a social context because of social network markets to reduce uncertainty about a 
novelty’s worth (information that is unreliably carried in price, Karpik 2010). This 
explains the importance of reviews – once a further professional specialism 
coordinated by novelty-bundling platforms such as newspapers but now routinely 
crowd-sourced – in social network markets. As Stark (2009) explains, the consumer 
may not know what they’re looking for, but they’ll recognize it when they find it. 
Furthermore, novelties will often present in multiple registers of value (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006), making novelty difficult to evaluate individually and in isolation. 
Novelty bundling markets can solve this problem by bundling novelties and 
organizing a socio-cultural context of comparative choice through the institutions and 
affordances of the market itself, such as the design or layout. 
Social network markets and novelty bundling markets are thus two ways of 
conceptualizing how when the consumer problem shifts from scarcity to abundance 
the social economy is part of the solution through the evolution of more complex 
cultural technologies for processing those increased flows of information.  
 
4 THE INNOVATION COMMONS 
The social economy is an important part of the innovation economy, yet this is poorly 
recognized in innovation theory, and even less so in innovation policy. The 
exceptions are work on user-communities and innovation (e.g. von Hippel 1986) and 
work on knowledge commons (Frischmann et al 2014), both of which Potts (2014) 
generalizes toward the idea of an innovation commons. The reason for this theoretical 
oversight and policy vacuum traces to the underlying analytic formulation of the so-
called ‘innovation problem’. 
As initially formulated by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962a), the innovation 
problem was specified in the language of welfare economics and microeconomic 
theory as market failure in the production of a public good (new information). The 
causes of the market failure are the fixed costs of discovery, appropriation (copying), 
and marginal cost pricing under perfect competition. Something has to give, and the 
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various departures and interventions to create rents to compensate for the fixed costs 
form the various stations of innovation policy. Intellectual property enables a 
monopoly rent to compensate for the fixed costs. R&D tax credits offset fixed costs. 
Targeted industry or technology policy creates artificial effective demand. Higher 
education subsidizes inputs into innovation investment. Public science nationalizes 
those fixed costs. In all cases, these involve a government solution, although 
sometimes, as with intellectual property or tax credits, this works through a market 
mechanism. 
These government solutions are designed to correct market failure. But there 
are also governance solutions that emerge when the innovation problem is translated 
from a market failure problem (fixed costs, free copying, and marginal cost pricing 
under perfect competition) to a collective action problem (free-riding in the creation 
of a public good). By conceptualizing the innovation problem directly as a (local) 
public good problem, this opens the way to see commons-type solutions as a third 
possibility besides market and government solution, with their standard solutions of 
private property enclosure or public regulation (Ostrom 1990). Community 
governance mechanisms can work for a knowledge or innovation commons, just as 
for a natural resource commons, by creating systems of rules that enable a community 
to cooperatively create new information and technologies. But unlike a natural 
resource commons, where the problem is avoiding over-exploitation (Hardin’s 
‘tragedy of the commons’), a knowledge or innovation commons has the inverse 
problem of avoiding under-contribution, such that the new technology or innovation 
is never developed because the community cannot arrive at mechanisms to enable 
contributions to occur and information and resources to be pooled and shared. 
There has been much recent work on so-called ‘peer production’ (Benkler 
2007), the most well-known examples of which are open-source software and 
collaborative projects such as Wikipedia. Several hypotheses explain the particular 
timing of the rise of peer production, from falling transactions costs of organization 
(Shirky 2008), growing surplus of wealth, time and technology available for reuse 
(Shirky 2010), to rise in education and ethics of sharing (Leadbeater 2008). However, 
peer production is also a natural form of human production (the market and hierarchic 
forms are the long-run aberrations). This line of argument increasingly rests in the 
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evolved nature of the humans as a highly cooperative species (Nowak 2006, 2011; 
Bowles and Gintis 2009; Bruni et al 2014).  
 An innovation commons emerges when we extend peer production, and the 
commons governance mechanisms that sustain those institutions of cooperation and 
protect against free-riding, to the production of new information and knowledge, to 
discovery and innovation. Innovation commons differ from other peer production 
commons by the extent of fundamental uncertainty. Most successful commons, and 
especially in natural resource situations, work because under usually specific 
circumstances they are simply more efficient ways of organizing production than 
alternative modes that use markets or hierarchies. Uncertainty does not enter into it. 
But an innovation commons is marked, by definition, with fundamental uncertainty 
about the value of what will be produced, the specific way it will be done (i.e. the 
technology), and therefore what the most valuable assets and contributions will be. 
The value of an innovation commons comes precisely in furnishing an institutional 
governance mechanism to facilitate the pooling and sharing of information under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty. This is valuable, and it is a product of the social 
economy. 
In Pottss (2014) model of innovation commons the resources necessary for 
innovation include the standard suite of material things, technologies, and 
contributions of time and money, but also information about the nature of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity. This is the information about costs, risks, market demand 
and likely sites of production, all of the information necessary to invest in starting a 
profitable firm. So there are two resources required for innovation – things and 
information – and while the things can be provided, incentivised or protected through 
property rights or government provision, the information is much harder to produce 
through those institutions. But a commons is a near ideal form for such. An 
innovation commons, such as a hackerspace (Kostakis et al. 2014), is actually two 
commons: a commons of shared resources of tools and things, and also an 
information commons of pooled and shared information that would otherwise be 
distributed and costly to assemble into useful information. 
An innovation commons is a socio-cultural proto-organizational form to 
produce coherent information for entrepreneurial venturing, and thus for the start of a 
evolutionary technological trajectory, the result of which becomes an ecology of firms 
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and markets, as an industry. Note that the agents in an innovation commons are not 
yet entrepreneurs – that is a subsequent phase – but more typically they are 
collaborative enthusiasts. They are connected and coordinated through socio-cultural 
not contractual mechanisms.   
The innovation commons model suggests the existence of a previously 
unrecognized ‘zero-th phase’ of what is normally a three-phase industry life cycle 
trajectory, in which phase 1 is entrepreneurial formation of early firms, phase 2 is the 
Schumpeterian build out (otherwise known as creative-destruction), and phase 3 is 
industry maturity. Phases 1-3 unfold in a market-government space, with social 
economy concern usually concentrated about the latter part of phase 2 and the 
penultimate state of phase 3. But the innovation commons approach suggests that the 
social economy assembles the necessary conditions for the growth of knowledge far 
earlier, in a phase before entrepreneurial contracting is even possible by furnishing 
cultural human conditions to pool and gather new ideas and for the sloughing of 
uncertainty. McCloskey’s (2015) humanomics approach to the study of ‘how 
betterment became ethical’ and how social equality drove the growth of knowledge in 
the early Bourgeois era makes a not dissimilar claim.  
 
5 DEMIC CONCENTRATION & INNOVATION 
The above two models are examples of cultural production of innovation. A third and 
in many ways consequent class of model – called the theory of ‘demic concentration’ 
(Hartley and Potts 2014) – makes this a two-step process in which culture does not 
produce innovation directly, but rather culture produces groups and groups produce 
knowledge. In this approach, which combines sociology, socio-economics and 
cultural studies, groups, with knowledge, compete, giving rise to conflict and also 
alliances that inevitably redraw the boundaries of those groups, thus redrawing the 
map of ideas that are meaningful within those groups, and thus that which can be 
individually learned (worked out independently) or socially learned (copied from the 
cultural repertoire). This cultural annealing process of group dynamics and the 
evolution of meaningfulness is a source of novelty, newness, and innovation arising 
from the social economy.   
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The theory of demic concentration is based on modern evolutionary theory in 
which culture is not viewed as an end in itself, or some crowning human flourish, but 
as a human evolutionary adaptation. The selective value of culture is that it makes 
groups; and the selective value of groups is that they make knowledge. Culture acts as 
the ‘survival vehicle’ (Pagel 2012: 12-13) for knowledge and technologies, and thus 
the group, hence solving the problem of inheritance of knowledge by securing it at 
group-historical rather than individual-behavioural level. Culture is not something 
that groups do; rather groups are something that culture does. In this view H. Sapiens 
is a language-using, high-trusting, instinctively cooperative pro-social groupish 
animal (Dopfer 2005; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Nowak 2011; Stoelhorst and 
Richerson, 2013; Wilson et al, 2013). Culture is the mechanism we use to form 
groups, and these groups (in-groups, that distinguish from out-groups) are the sites of 
cooperation and knowledge making.  
Hartley and Potts (2014) call a culture-made group a deme. In biology, a deme 
refers to an inter-breeding group that shares genes, and in political science a demos is 
an inter-voting group that shares citizenship. Evolved human nature is both altruistic 
(pro-social) and parochial (adversarially groupish) (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Pagel 
2012). We cooperate within a social group, but can be vicious to outgroups (Tajfel 
1970). In other words, our groupishness is also groupish (Gintis 2012): we make 
ingroups and outgroups, and the identifying characteristic of a deme is that it 
distinguishes itself from other demes, via inclusion/exclusion institutions from 
language and story to law and religion. Cultural dynamics work along the boundaries 
of groups, at the level of communicating groups and systems, not individuals 
(Luhmann 1991). Ideas and knowledge are ‘culturally situated’ in the sense that we 
acquire ideas preferentially from our deme: from within our language, our social 
references, our (extended) family or trusted non-kin ‘honorary relatives’ (Pagel 2012): 
from within our ‘we-group’ and against ‘they groups’. (As signaled earlier, this is also 
a solid finding from science and technology scholars (see Williams and Edge 1996).)  
This groupishness explains what we call ‘universal-adversarialism’: within a trusted 
‘we’-group all knowledge is knowable and universally accessible; but it is opposed to 
the untrusted knowledge of ‘they’-groups.  
Culture is an adaptation that enables humans to make groups. A deme, 
conceived as a culturally-made group, is an autopoietic communicative system of 
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externalized knowledge (Luhmann 1986) – externalized in technology (Arthur 2009) 
and other exosomatic forms as well as in the ‘linked brains’ (crowd-source) of a 
group. Demes – both territorial and ‘mentifacts’ (Huxley 1955); and growing in 
number over historical time, especially demes-per-person per new communications 
technology (speech, writing, print, electronics, internet) 
In cultural science, innovation is a cultural process of ideas being integrated 
into the ‘we’-group as its boundaries are redrawn to include ideas previously or 
otherwise part of a ‘they-group’. That is, an idea can be acquired through individual 
or social learning only if it already exists within an individual’s deme, and is therefore 
meaningful. Newness and innovation occur by an evolutionary semiotic process of 
group-dynamics we call ‘demic concentration’. Demic concentration is the formation 
of such a bounded group; cf. demic diffusion (Cavelli-Sforza 2000) where the 
knowledge moves across groups through individual migration. With demic diffusion, 
knowledge flows out (e.g. farming practices across Neolithic Eurasia, carried by 
individuals, not by mere copying). With demic concentration, conversely, knowledge 
flows in: but because of low-trust settings for ‘they’-group originated knowledge, it 
cannot simply be copied but must be translated into ‘we’-group terms (Lotman 1990). 
With demic concentration, the boundaries of a ‘knowledge-group’ change: this 
boundary change is innovation.  
There are multiple mechanisms by which culture makes demes. The oldest is 
through stories (Booker 2004, Boyd 2009). The economics of stories has been 
developed in the context of the rhetoric of economics (McCloskey 1985, McCloskey 
and Klamer 1995). McCloskey (2010) argues that the moral virtues of the bourgeois 
story explain the rise of industrial capitalism in the West. Stories bind individuals to 
groups, but also to the purposes of those groups, which can then be exploited by 
leaders in the service of, for example, nation-building (war journalism about national 
character) or employee loyalty and effort (stories of corporate culture, e.g. Harari 
(2014) on Peugeot). Stories create meaningful selves and citizens and therefore demic 
communities, as can be seen in journalism (Hartley 1992), but so too do children and 
especially youth (child-groups beyond kin) as they remake culture anew (Konner 
2010).  
Culture is usually viewed as a repository of past knowledge, artifacts and ways 
of being that constitute collective identity and heritage, sometimes called ‘cultural 
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capital’ (Throsby 1999). But the purpose of culture is not (only) to carry the past, but 
(also) to invent the future: the semiotic or cultural system – the ‘semiosphere’ 
(Lotman 1990, 2009) – must be stable enough to use, flexible enough to adapt and 
generative along its interconnecting edges. Culture creates demes and demes carry 
and coordinate knowledge as interacting semiospheres. The growth of knowledge 
therefore requires changes in the boundaries of those semiospheres, including in the 
number of them available for habitation by any one individual. 
Such boundary changes will not necessarily appear as creative innovation. 
More likely, they will look like systemic clash and conflict (Vedres and Stark 2010) – 
what Hartley and Potts (2014: ch 4) call malviosine (‘bad neighbor’). Bad neighbors 
have different knowledge. That is why they are different groups. Equivalently, good 
neighbors have similar or relatable knowledge. That is how cooperation is possible; 
knowledge among members is interoperable. But different knowledge (‘out-
knowledge’ as it were) is also valuable as a source of innovation and spur to 
adaptation for ingroups. Different knowledge in external groups is simply not 
available in a way that can be easily accessed or used. It cannot be socially learned. 
Indeed, it tends to be repelled and may be strongly protected by the outgroup. The 
clash of demic systems, which concentrates in world cities for instance, is in this way 
productive of newness, meaningfulness and the reinvention of culture.  
Culture plainly carries past knowledge, identity and meaning, and a societal 
form of capital and wealth. This basic model of culture that runs through 
anthropology, sociology and cultural economics forms the standard approach to 
cultural policy as the preservation of a stock of cultural capital and wealth. But culture 
is also a mechanism to produce newness and grow knowledge. Even more, culture is a 
mechanism to produce newness from sources that cannot be identified in advance, but 
which may arise at any point throughout and among social and semiotic systems. 
Culture is thus not only a mechanism to maintain and reproduce past knowledge 
(culturally embodied, or socially learned), but also a mechanism for the production of 
new knowledge. 
This ‘cultural science’ approach derives from a theme arising out of cultural 
studies – the study of ordinary culture in the Raymond Williams (1958) sense – of 
culture as productive, and specifically as productive of novelty. Culture makes 
groups, groups make knowledge, and new ideas (contributions to knowledge) occur as 
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the tensioned and conflicted boundary of a group changes. Newness and novelty are 
not the production of an idea, using factor inputs (the production function for ideas), 
but the reformation of a group boundary such that an idea becomes meaningful. This 




On the face of it these three domains we have examined – how consumers deal with 
novelty (in section 3); the common pooling of information for invention and market 
discovery (in section 4); and the role of culture in group formation, and therefore 
knowledge making (in section 5), might seem disparate. But what ties these domains 
together is that they are all instances of social cooperation in the face of uncertainty to 
produce and process new ideas. What is interesting about this approach is that it 
subverts the ‘individual creative genius’ model of invention and rests firmly on a 
model of the coordination of distributed information, or the social use of information 
to create and navigate novelty in order to realize value. These are three distinct but 
interlocking parts of the process by which invention and innovation is a social 
process.  
For the past half-century and more, social economics has sought to elucidate 
and investigate the relationship between the economy and social values. It has 
developed theories of the behaviors and interactions of economic agents through 
concepts of social capital and social markets, and examined the social impact of 
economic change. It has been suggested that the overriding conception of the relation 
of the social economy to government and market maps to the Freudian scheme of a 
critical, moralizing social economy super-ego to the rational ego of government 
market-failure correctives and the id of the market’s basic instinctual drives. This 
super-ego conception of the social economy is descriptive of the modern research 
program of social economics. But an unintended consequence is that this same 
conception tends to overlook how some of the id-like basic social drives and instincts, 
particularly in relation to knowledge-sharing and collective ways of dealing with 
uncertainty, and the way in which atavistic and deeply human socio-cultural forces 
affect how novelty and knowledge is produced within economic systems. There is an 
opportunity here, we suggest, to advance a positive line of analysis of the social 
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economics of innovation by integrating these socio-cultural mechanisms and 
processes.   
We have sought to make two contributions. First, to locate social economics 
within the literature on the economics of growth and innovation, finding that the 
extant explanations by and large ignore the role of the social economy as an 
explanatory mechanism. This is traced to the way new knowledge is represented as 
either a product of discovery or learning. We show how the economics of culture is 
boxed within these options, systematically excluding a further possibility – namely as 
generative of innovation.  
As such, the social economy produces rather than simply governs innovation. 
This, then, is the second contribution, in setting out three new suites of models to 
explain how innovative activity is shaped by social processes. These are models of 
socially coordinated markets; culturally incentivized innovation commons; and a 
model of cultural production of newness and innovation. These three models 
represent different aspects of the way in which the social economy is generative of 
newness and of the production of novelty and innovation. We suggest they furnish a 
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